Evidence -- How Some Courts Have Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Polygraph by Blackwood, L. James
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 51 | Number 4 Article 14
3-1-1973
Evidence -- How Some Courts Have Learned to
Stop Worrying and Love the Polygraph
L. James Blackwood
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
L. J. Blackwood, Evidence -- How Some Courts Have Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Polygraph, 51 N.C. L. Rev. 900 (1973).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol51/iss4/14
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Evidence-How Some Courts Have Learned to Stop Worrying and Love
the Polygraph
Courts have traditionally viewed the polygraph or "lie detector"
with suspicion. Although the polygraph is widely used in non-judicial
areas and in pre-trial investigation, test results have not been admissible
as evidence in court.' However, three recent trial court deci-
sions-United States v. Ridling,2 United States v. Zeiger,3 and a pa-
ternity proceeding styled A v. B4-have reexamined the issue and have
ruled that expert testimony interpreting polygraph results is admissible.
Ridling was a prosecution for perjury.' Defendant sought to have
admitted into evidence the results of a polygraph test he had taken
voluntarily. After a pre-trial evidentiary hearing, the court ruled that
polygraph results were admissible on the limited issue of the defendant's
veracity.' However, the court conditioned admissibility on defendant's
subjecting himself voluntarily to a second test to be conducted by a
polygraph examiner appointed by the court.
7
Defendant in Zeiger was charged with committing an assault with
intent to kill while armed and other related offenses.' After granting a
hearing on the admissibility of the results of a polygraph test given by
the police but favorable to defendant, the court ruled in favor of its
general admission and allowed the expert to testify on the substance of
defendant's answers to factual questions about the crime as well as to
defendant's truthfulness on each answer?
In A v. B, a paternity proceeding, the court had ordered that both
parties submit to a polygraph test before trial, but the results were not
to be given to the court.'" When the mother testified that respondent was
the father, respondent sought to introduce the results of the polygraph
'See generally Bailey, Book Review, I SUFF. L. REV. 137, 138 (1967), in which the author
strongly argues that the time has come for the courts to allow admission of polygraph evidence.
2350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
3350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1972).
. Misc. 2d -, 336 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Fam. Ct., Niagara Co. 1972).
1350 F. Supp. at 92.
VId. at 98.
1Id. at 96-97.
1350 F. Supp. at 686.
I1d. at 691.
__ Misc. 2d at -, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 840. Since the respondent's only defense was that
the mother had had relations with other men, the trial court apparently hoped that if the polygraph
resalts showed the mother was truthful in her allegation that the respondent was the only conceiva-
ble father, the parties would settle. Id. at -, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
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test. After a hearing, the court allowed the polygraph examiner to testify
that the polygraph indicated that the mother was telling the truth when
she admitted during the examination to having sexual relations with
other men at the approximate time of conception."
The purpose of this note is to analyze these cases to discern the
probative value of polygraph results, the evidential standard that should
control admissibility of polygraph evidence, and the issues on which
polygraph evidence may be particularly helpful to the trier of fact.
12
The modern polygraph 3 measures various physiological respon-
ses 4 of the subject on graphs which run continually throughout the
course of the examination. 5 These responses do not automatically ap-
"Id. at _ 336 N.Y.S.2d at 841-42.
"2The issue of fifth aimendment guarantees against self-incrimination was not of immediate
concern in the context of these cases. In both Ridling and Zeiger the defendants were seeking to
introduce the evidence; A v. B was a civil action. Consequently, this note does not attempt to
discuss fifth amendment issues which would be involved in criminal actions in which the prosecu-
tion is seeking to introduce polygraph results unfavorable to a defendant. However, it should be
pointed out that Ridling stated that the prosecution could introduce unfavorable polygraph evi-
dence which was obtained under the proper conditions when the character of a defendant was in
issue. See note 60 infra.
"The development of the modern polygraph can be traced back to 1895 when Cesare Lom-
broso experimented with the correlation between lying and changes in blood pressure and pulse by
means of a "hydtosphymograph." J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH
("LIE-DETECTOR") TECHNIQUE 1 (1966) [hereinafter cited as REID & INBAU]. This is the first
recorded use of a scientific device to measure deception. However, there are existing reports that
Indians used a deception test based on the premise that lying inhibited the secretion of saliva in
the mouth-an accused was ordered to chew rice and if it stuck to his gums he was considered
guilty. Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 YALE
L.J. 694, 696 (1961).
"The present polygraph records not only blood pressure and pulse but also respiration and
galvanic skin reflex or electrodermal response. REID & INBAU 2-3. In 1945 it was discovered that
blood pressure changes sufficient to upset the accuracy of the test could be caused by unobserved
muscle activity. An instrument was then devised for recording this activity in addition to the
previously mentioned physiological responses. Id. at 3.
"5A typical polygraph examination takes about one hour. Highleyman, The Deceptive Cer-
tainty of the "Lie Detector," 10 HAST. L. J. 47, 55 (1958). This is the approximate length for the
entire examination; each separate test usually lasts only five minutes. Note, The Polygraphic
Technique: A Selective Analysis, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 330,332 (1971). Since the detection of veracity
depends on the variations in the subject's physical reactions, care must be taken to insure that
extraneous factors such as unexpected noises do not cause false readings. REID & INBAU 5-6. The
examination itself consists of a series of oral questions to which the subject must answer "yes" or
"no." Questions concerning the matter under investigation are interspersed with irrelevant ques-
tions. The examiner places the number of the question and a symbol indicating the answer given
on the recording graph as each question is asked so that later the reactions corresponding to each
type of question can be readily compared. Id. at 27. Several runs of the test are made to insure
that a responsive norm for the subject is established and to allow the examiner to adapt his
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pear on the graph labelled as "truth" or "lie"; a determination of truth
or deception can only be made by a competent examiner's analysis of
these responses. Such determinations are based on the premise that
variations in these physiological responses as questions are answered by
the subject are an indication of his truthfulness:
[T]he act of lying leads to conscious conflict; conflict induces fear
or anxiety, which in turn results in clearly measurable physiological
change. . . . The theory contains two fundamental assumptions: first,
a regular relationship between lying and certain emotional states; sec-
ond, a regular relationship between these emotional states and changes
in the body."6
Those who oppose admission of polygraph evidence have argued that
the premise is invalid.'7 In support of their argument they state that
erroneous interpretations can be caused by such factors as mental or
physical abnormalities; subject unresponsiveness; emotional tension,
fear, or anxiety; and unqualified examiners."8 Although these conten-
tions probably explain the causes for the errors made in some tests, they
do not contradict the high degree of accuracy that the polygraph has
been shown to possess. Furthermore, although critics have generally
argued that the accuracy of the test is no better than seventy to eighty
percent," other studies have shown an accuracy rate of over ninety
percent.2 0 Witnesses testifying in favor of admission in Zeiger all
questioning to prior responses of the subject. Reruns are continued until the subject's responses
consistently indicate either truth or deception. Highleyman, supra at 55-57.
"Skolnick, supra note 13, at 699-700 (emphasis in original).
'
7Id. at 701-02.
'"See generally Highleyman, supra note 15, at 57-61. But see REID & INBAU 168-203. The
observation of the subject by the examiner and the recordings on the graph itself help to prevent
any errors due to an abnormality of the examinee. Id. at 202. However, an experiment using groups
of "normal," "neurotic," and "psychotic" subjects tended to show that polygraph examiners are
less likely to correctly interpret, much less identify, persons suffering from severe mental abnormal-
ities. Heckel, Brokaw, Salzberg, & Wiggins, Polygraphic Variations in Reactivity Between Delu-
sional, Non-Delusional, and Control Groups in a "Crime" Situation, 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 380,
383 (1962). This has led some commentators to suggest that additional controls be used to guard
against error due to subject eccentricity. See note 58 infra. The repetition and length of the testing
procedure tend to reduce excess anxiety or tension. REID & INBAU 174. Since the proper function-
ing of the polygraph depends on a conscious awareness of the truth and fear of detection, any lack
of such consciousness is likely to produce only an inconclusive result. Id. at 168.
"MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 207, at 506-07 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK].
"For example, the authors of the leading study on polygraphic technique report that in over
35,000 actual cases the percentage of known error was less than one percent and that about five
percent of the remainder constituted inconclusive tests. REID & INBAU 234.
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claimed that their tests had produced very accurate results; one testified
that there were only six errors in the 2,400 tests he had conducted that
were subject to verificationY.2 Even the psychologist who testified for the
prosecution in Zeiger admitted that he would place the accuracy of the
polygraph at a minimum of eighty-five percent.22 Furthermore, a large
part of the ten to twenty-five percent comprising non-accurate results
represents not erroneous determinations but merely tests that produced
inconclusive results.?
Despite the concurrence of opinion that polygraph evidence is relia-
ble enough to be of some probative value, it has met almost unanimous
exclusion in court. The first attempt to introduce such evidence came
in 1923 in Frye v. United States.4 In that case defendant sought to
introduce an expert to testify to the results of a systolic blood pressure
deception test,2 5 a forerunner to the modern polygraph. The court, in
excluding the evidence, said:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Some-
where in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must
be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or dis-
covery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.
26
Since Frye, virtually all other courts across the country have
reached the same result, and most of these have relied on the poly-
graph's failure to meet the Frye standard of "general acceptance." 7
21350 F. Supp. at 689.
21d. at 689-90.
23Note 20 supra.
24293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.1923).
21Id. at 1013.
2 ld. at 1014 (emphasis added). It is of interest to note that another person subsequently
confessed to the crime for which the defendant in Frye was convicted. See Wicker, The Polygraphic
Truth Test and the* Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REv. 711, 715 (1953).
2See, e.g., United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1009 (1970); Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 929
(1959); People v. York, 174 Cal. App. 2d 305, 344 P.2d 811 (1959); People v. Becker, 300 Mich.
562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942); Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949); State v. Foye,
254 N.C. 704, 120 S.E.2d 169 (1961); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495, cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951); Grant v. State, 213 Tenn. 440, 374 S.W.2d 391 (1964); Davis v. State,
165 Tex. Crim. 456, 308 S.W.2d 880 (1957); State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
The only reported exception was a trial court decision, People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d
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Furthermore, courts have not allowed the use of polygraph evidence in
civil cases28 and have found reversible error when collateral references
are made to the testy.2  The only exception is that some courts have
allowed the opposing parties to stipulate before the test is administered
that the results could be admitted into evidence."
Although Zeiger reiterated the rule in Frye, its restatement of that
rule amounted to a decision not to apply it." Ridling referred to the
"general acceptance" rule explicitly but refused to apply that stan-
dard.32 A v. B did not refer to the rule at all. The refusal of all three
courts to apply the Frye standard stemmed from the interpretation that
it had received in subsequent cases. The courts have interpreted "general
acceptance" as requiring proof that the reliability of the polygraph is
so high that a court would be justified in taking judicial notice of the
validity of the polygraph test.3 3 Furthermore, the failure of the "gen-
eral acceptance" standard to enumerate any guidelines for admission
has been criticized:
The Frye standard . . . tends to obscure . . . proper considerations
by asserting an undefinable general acceptance as the principle [sic] if
not sole determinative factor. The ultimate purpose of the Frye rule,
the prevention of the introduction into evidence of specious and un-
founded scientific principles or conclusions based upon such principles,
is certainly unobjectionable. It is questionable, however, whether the
Frye rule, with its introduction of a basic inconsistency into the law
of evidence, is essential to the purpose. Most of the considerations
which have apparently moved the courts to apply the Frye doctrine to
various scientific principles may be adequately accomodated within the
usual rules . . .
348 (Queens Co. Ct. 1938), but this decision was impliedly overruled by People v. Forte, 279 N.Y.
204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938). For a discussion of numerous unreported trial decisions that have
allowed admissibility, see Ferguson, Polygraph v. Outdated Precedent, 35 TEX. B.J. 531 (1972),
2'E.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bros., Inc., 289 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1961); Stone v. Earp, 331
Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951).
"E.g., State v. Driver, 38 N.J. 255, 183 A.2d 655 (1962) (mentioning that defendant refused
to take test); Leeks v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 326, 245 P.2d 764 (1952) (mentioning that defendant
took lie detector test).
"E.g., State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962); People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App.
2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948). But see Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951); State
v. Trimble, 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961).
3'350 F. Supp. at 686-88.
32350 F. Supp. at 94-95.
"See MCCORMICK § 203, at 491; Kaplan, The Lie Detector: An Analysis of Its Place in
the Law of Evidence, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 381, 385-86 (1964).




Thus, critics of the Frye standard have urged that the traditional
standards of expert qualification and of balancing logical relevancy
against exclusionary policy considerations not only are sufficient safe-
guards but also enable the courts to determine under what circumstan-
ces the admissibility of polygraph evidence would be proper.35 As
Ridling pointed out, under traditional standards a proper foundation in
a particular case would require a showing that: (1) the premise on which
the evidence is based rests on a valid principle of science so that the
introduction of such evidence would be of aid to the trier of fact; (2)
the expert witness testifying is sufficiently qualified in the particular
field of concern; (3) the application of the polygraph test in the specific
case under consideration properly followed all applicable procedures to
insure that the particular test is reliable; and (4) the probative value of
the polygraph evidence in the particular case in which it is sought to be
introduced overcomes any policy reasons for exclusion. This sequen-
tial approach enables a court to consider objectively the separate factors
involved in a decision on the admissibility of polygraph evidence instead
of forcing it to consider the whole problem at one time as the "general
acceptance" standard has required.
Ridling stated that the admissibility of polygraph evidence in gen-
eral "requires that the opinion of the expert be relevant to the issue
before the Court. The acceptance of the basic theory is a part of the
process of making the evidence relevant."37 Zeiger interpreted Frye as
demanding only "general acceptance among the experts that current
polygraph technique possesses a degree of reliability which satisfies the
courts of its probative value."38 Thus, both the Ridling and Zeiger
courts required preliminary proof that the general theory of the poly-
graph be "accepted." By requiring such proof, however, neither court
was demanding that the polygraph be demonstrably infallible. The proof
required was only that necessary to show that the introduction of poly-
graph evidence makes "the desired inference more probable than it
would be without the evidence. ' 3 Since both courts found the poly-
graph to be reliable, both held it to be of probative value."
"See MCCORMICK § 203, at 491. See generally Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A
Conflict ii Theory, 5 VAND. L. REv. 385, 395-98 (1952).
20350 F. Supp. at 94-95.
371d.
1350 F. Supp. at 688.2 MCCORMICK § 185, at 437 (emphasis omitted).
9'350 F. Supp. at 690; 350 F. Supp. at 95.
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After determining that polygraph evidence in general can be of
probative value, Ridling, Zeiger, and A v. B then balanced the particular
relevancy of polygraph evidence in the cases before them against the
policy reasons for excluding the evidence-fear that the trier of fact will
take the evidence as conclusive," dislike for testimony that usurps the
traditional function of the jury,42 and concern that collateral material
likely to cause jury distraction and to waste time will be introduced. The
courts' fear of the effect of polygraph evidence on the minds of the triers
of fact is what originally led them to require, in effect, that the poly-
graph be infallible.4 3 But the Ridling and Zeiger courts decided that by
using limiting instructions and by permitting extensive cross-
examination pointing out to the jury the polygraph's shortcomings, the
trial judge could adequately control the jury's perception of the poly-
graph's reliability.44
As to the usurpation question, Zeiger noted that, although the
government in Frye had argued the point on appeal, the court "made
no comment in agreement with this position, but on the contrary, indi-
cated that at some point 'the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized.' "5 Furthermore, as Professor Strong pointed out:
Traditionally, even ordinary expert testimony on "ultimate issues" has
been judicially frowned upon. If incursion upon the jury function is
viewed as a serious objection, many scientific principles suffer from the
liability that they are commonly and necessarily incorporated into
devices or tests the results of which, unlike expert opinion, cannot be
broken down into less conclusory but still helpful data.
The fear of causing jury distraction to unnecessary collateral issues
does not truly arise by the mere admission of polygraph evidence; when
analyzed, the fear is that the main issue would take a back seat as the
parties attempt to prove or disprove the utility of the polygraph and that
"See, e.g., Highleyman, supra note 15, at 63: "[T]he use of 'lie detector' evidence invites
confusion between (I) the reliability of the objective physiological facts which are recorded by the
polygraph, and (2) the reliability of the subjective inferences of truth or deception which are drawn
from those facts by the examiner."
"See Strong, supra note 34, at 13.
'See, e.g., People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955) (seventy-five to ninety
percent accuracy held insufficient); People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 206, 18 N.E.2d 31, 32 (1938)
("Can [the lie detector] be depended upon to operate with complete success on persons of varying
emotional stability?").
"350 F. Supp. at 691: 350 F. Supp. at 98.
s350 F. Supp. at 691-92 n.32.
"Strong, supra note 34, at 13.
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the admission of polygraph results with respect to one witness would
necessitate that all witnesses be subjected to it. The first consideration
is valid only in the sense that the introduction of any complicated and
disputed testimony will be followed by other supporting or contradicting
evidence; however, the court has the power to minimize this result by
limiting the extent of supporting or contradicting testimony.47 The sec-
ond concern-that all witnesses testifying would be required to submit
to a polygraph test-is one that has been raised by several courts.
48
Considering the waste of time and marginal usefulness of such evidence,
Ridling stated that it would not allow such a wide use of the polygraph:
It is argued that polygraph use will result in the injection of many
collateral issues in the trial. This could be the case if the Court were
to permit its use on all witnesses as has been urged by the defendant
in this case. This Court is not willing to go so far. 9
The trial court in A v. B, also, would not have allowed such a broad
application of the polygraph on the trial process; it held that polygraph
use was limited to the parties to the proceeding who testified. 0 Zeiger
did not even refer to this objection.
Since the reliability of the polygraph depends largely on the exam-
iner who gives the test and interprets the physiological responses re-
corded,5" the court in Ridling was especially concerned about the inter-
preter's qualifications.5 2 Although Zeiger3 and A v. B54 both discussed
the qualifications of the polygraph expert who had given the particular
test in each case, neither court expressed the concern that Ridling did.
This can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that, unlike Ridling
in which the defendant had personally chosen his examiner, 55 the poly-
graph experts in Zeiger and A v. B were not chosen by the defendants
and thus were not likely to be partial to them."
11350 F. Supp. at 691.
"'See, e.g., State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 627, 185 P.2d 147, 150 (1947); Henderson v. State,
94 Okla. Crim. 45, - 230 P.2d 495, 504, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951).
11350 F. Supp. at 96.
50 Misc. 2d at -- , 336 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
51See, e.g., REID & INBAU 235; Skolnick, supra note 13, at 705; Comment, The Polygraph
Revisited: An Argument for Admissibility, 4 SUFF. L. REv. 111, 119-20 (1969).
52350 F. Supp. at 96.
1350 F. Supp. at 690.
5. Misc. 2d at _ 336 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
1350 F. Supp. at 96-97.
"In Zeiger the examiner was a member of the police force at the time the test was given. 350
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As Ridling pointed out, the problem of expert qualification was
accentuated in that case because the polygraph profession has not as yet
developed sufficient standards by which to police itself.57 Consequently,
Ridling concluded that "[b]ecause it may not be easy for the Court to
determine the quality of the polygraph experts tendered by the defen-
dant, it seems proper in such cases to cause polygraph experts of the
Court's own choosing to be appointed who should be directed to test the
defendant."" In addition, Ridling limited the admissibility of evidence
of polygraph results, whether by the testimony of the court-appointed
expert or by that of the defendant's expert, to those cases in which the
court-appointed expert can definitely conclude that the subject is or is
not telling the truth." If the court-appointed expert can make such a
conclusion, then the evidence is admissible, the trial court said, whether
his interpretation agrees with that of the defendant's expert or not."0
No judicial procedures designed to minimize the importance of the
objectionable features of polygraph evidence, short of exclusion, can
altogether eliminate the risk of admitting unreliable results. Thus the
court must ultimately balance the probative value of the polygraph
evidence in the light of the particular circumstances in which it is sought
to be introduced against the considerations that argue for exclusion. The
courts in Ridling and A v. B stated that they favored limiting the admis-
F. Supp. at 686. In A v. B the expert was the official polygraph examiner for the county.
Misc. 2d at _ 336 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
17350 F. Supp. at 96. Because of the problem of a lack of standards among the polygraph
profession, REID & INBAU at 257 suggested that:
Before permitting the results [of a polygraph test] to be admitted as evidence in any
case, however, the court should require the following: (1) That the examiner possess a
college degree. (2) That he has received at least six months of internship training under
an experienced, competent examiner or examiners with a sufficient volume of case work
to afford frequent supervised testing in actual case situations. (3) That the witness have
at least five years' experience as a specialist in the field of Polygraph examinations. (4)
That the examiner's testimony must be based upon Polygraph records that he produces
in court and which are available for cross examination purposes.
1350 F. Supp. at 96-97. Because of the particular danger of polygraph error caused by the
examiner's inability in some cases to interpret the results correctly when the subject is psychologi-
cally abnormal, some commentators have suggested that obtaining a competent examiner is not
enough. Instead, they recommend using a psychologist who can more readily observe the subject's
behavior in addition to the examiner. Comment, 4 SUFF. L. REV., supra note 51, at 122 n.60.
11350 F. Supp. at 97.
"Id. Since truth was a substantive issue in the case, Ridling stated that the results of the test
could be used by either party. Id. at 98. Furthermore, because a polygraph test requires the
voluntary consent of the subject, the court felt that any privilege against self-incrimination could
be waived if adequate warnings were given. Id. at 97.
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sibility of polygraph evidence to those instances in which the question
of truthfulness is of extraordinary importance."' As Ridling pointed out:
A perjury case is based on "willfully" or "knowingly" giving false
evidence. The experts all agree that the polygraph examination is
aimed exactly at this aspect of truth. A subject . . . may be honestly
mistaken as to a fact and, if he answers according to his honest belief,
the operator will interpret the results as being a truthful answer.
62
The court in A v. B allowed polygraph testimony for the purpose of
attacking the credibility of the mother who had testified.6 :' The trial
court opinion noted that on this issue the polygraph was far more relia-
ble than many kinds of evidence, such as past conviction of crime or
reputation for truthfulness, that courts have normally allowed on the
question of credibility.64 Thus, Ridling and A v. B both held that the
usefulness of polygraph evidence outweighed the exclusionary consider-
ations when a person's truthfulness is a direct issue in the case or has
been put in issue by his own testimony. But both courts were careful to
distinguish credibility issues from questions of mere accuracy in order
to prevent the introduction of polygraph evidence under circumstances
in which the jury might interpret favorable polygraph results as signify-
ing the accuracy of a witness's recollection of facts. 5
In contrast to Ridling and A v. B, Zeiger placed no limitation on
the use of the polygraph; instead, the court stated it would allow the
polygraph examiner "to assess the truthfulness of the defendant's an-
swers to factual questions concerning the crime [of assault with intent
to kill while armed] . ,,"6 If this means that the polygraph results
were admissible only to show the defendant's subjective intent, then the
scope of admissibility is probably no wider in Zeiger than in Ridling.67
6'350 F. Supp. at 98; - Misc. 2d at , 336 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
'350 F. Supp. at 93.
8 Misc. 2d at _, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
"Id. at -, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 843-44.
1350 F. Supp. at 98; - Misc. 2d at - , 336 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
11350 F. Supp. at 691.
7The element of intent in the crime charged against the defendant in Zeiger is the same as
the knowledge requirement for a perjury conviction in Ridling. Both are subjective, as opposed to
objective, elements of a crime. The ability of the polygraph to accurately detect the subject's
veracity on each element is not conditioned on the subject's being able to recollect the actual facts.
See text accompanying note 62 supra. At least one court, however, has excluded polygraph evi-
dence which a defendant sought to introduce on the issue of criminal intent because the defendant
was intoxicated at the time of the crime and because the defendant could have rationalized his
intentions between the time of the crime and the time of the polygraph test five months later. State
v. Hollywood, 138 Mont. 561, 575, 358 P.2d 437, 444 (1960).
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However, the quoted language is just as capable of being interpteted to
permit the polygraph evidence to show the defendant's belief as to how
the crime occurred. Such a decision is disturbing on at least two counts.
First, the polygraph only detects deception when there is a conscious
conflict."' It is possible for the subject to be honestly mistaken in his
memory of the events that occurred 9 or for the subject to have so
rationalized the crime 0 that there is no conflict. In such a case the
polygraph is incapable of detecting the mistaken recollection. Secondly,
the polygraph examiner cannot be cross-examined as to any fine but
crucial distinctions between the way the events actually occurred and the
way the facts were posed to the subject during the polygraph examina-
tion.7' Since the examiner's opinion is limited to his interpretation of the
actual responses given to the test questions, any statement by him on
the effect that such distinctions would have on the polygraph results is
no more than an unsupportable opinion. Only the defendant can furnish
the needed answer; however, since he has a constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination, he can refuse to testify and leave the jury only
to guess whether or not any crucial distinctions exist.7 2
The high reliability of the polygraph cannot be denied. Neither can
it be gainsaid that the polygraph intrudes on the traditional function of
the jury and is subject to the possibility of jury misuse. For too long,
however, the courts have preempted a rational consideration of these
countervailing points by the use of the nebulous "general acceptance"
standard. Ridling, Zeiger, and A v. B have removed this obstacle to
objective analysis. By so doing, these courts were able at least to begin
to formulate guidelines under which polygraph evidence can be properly
admitted. This is a welcome approach, regardless of what one may think
of the courts' resolutions of the issues they have raised. Ridling and A
v. B were careful in limiting the issues to which they thought polygraph
testimony would be of more than marginal utility. Zeiger, on the other
"See text accompanying note 16 supra.
"See text accompanying note 62 supra.
"This reason led the court in State v. Hollywood, 138 Mont. 561, 575, 358 P.2d 437, 444
(1960), to exclude the test results of an examinatiofi given over five months after the commission
of the crime. But see REID & INBAU 179-80.
"See Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 377, 37 N.W.2d,593, 597 (1949).
"See State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 659, 246 N.W. 314, 318 (1933). However, since this issue
has not actually been presented to the courts, it is possible that the introduction by a defendant of
favorable polygraph results may be held to constitute a waiver, at least as to those matters raised
directly by the polygraph evidence, of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
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hand, did not so limit the circumstances of admission. The usefulness
of polygraph evidence on the Zeiger facts is not so apparent, and the
evidence should have been excluded. However, the usefulness of the
evidence in the narrow circumstances under which Ridling and A v. B
allowed admissibility is apparent. The experience gained from such
admissions may then be used to guide the courts in determining whether
the admissions door should be opened wider.
L. JAMES BLACKWOOD
Evidence-Testimony of Government Informers in Narcotics Cases
The practice of using informers in an effort to apprehend narcotics
peddlers and as a source of information is openly admitted by prosecu-
tors and police officials.' This standard technique is considered "essen-
tial" in combating the drug traffic since there are no complaining wit-
nesses or victims-only willing sellers and willing buyers-a fact that
forces law enforcement officers to "initiate cases" to combat the drug
trade.2 It has been estimated that almost ninety-five percent of all fed-
eral narcotics convictions are obtained as the result of the work of
informers3 and that any government success in penetrating large selling
organizations has been possible only through the use of informers and
undercover agents.4
In order for the government to infiltrate the illicit drug traffic, it
must use leverage to obtain the cooperation of reluctant participants in
the traffic.' An informant usually is a person who is facing criminal
charges and who is induced into cooperating with the government in
order to receive a "break" in the criminal process.' If an informant is
'A. LINDESMITH, THE ADDICT AND THE LAW 36 (1965) [hereinafter cited as LINDESMITH]; U.S.
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE RE-
PORT: NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE 8 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
2TASK FORCE REPORT 8.
'Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28
FORDHAM L. REV. 399, 403 (1959).
Ild.; LINDESMITH 43. The Bureau of Narcotics operates on the premise that the more "buys"
set up and the more violators enlisted as informers, the deeper the government will penetrate into




'TASK FORCE REPORT 8. The "break" given informants is usually a reduction in charges.
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